Abstract: A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships and supposed relationships between players. A relationship is a numerical value that denotes how one player cares for the payoffs of another player, while a supposed relationship is another numerical value that denotes a player's belief about the relationship between two players. The players choose their strategies by taking into consideration not only the material payoffs but also relationships and their change. Two games, a prisoner's dilemma and a repeated ultimatum game, are analyzed as examples of application of this model.
Introduction
There have been two kinds of researches in game theory: cooperative games theory pioneered by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and non-cooperative games theory developed by Nash (1951) . When analyzing a game, one first needs to confirm what type the game is because absolutely different methods will be used for two types of games. Methods for non-cooperative games are based on Nash equilibrium, various perfects of Nash equilibrium (e.g., Strong Nash Equilibrium by Aumann (1959) , Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium by Selten (1965 Selten ( , 1975 , Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Strict Nash Equilibrium by Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( , 1973 ) and the folk theorems, while cooperative games are analyzed by means of coalitions, core and Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ). The most important work comes from non-cooperative analysis, although some scholars regain interest in cooperative games recently.
A question is whether or not any games can be just categorized into these two types? Consider contract bridge, the card game that is played by four players in two competing partnerships. This game is neither cooperative nor non-cooperative because the relations between individual players are not identical. There are both cooperation between partners and competition between two partnerships.
The players in a non-cooperative game only care for their own payoffs whilst the players in a cooperative game care for the payoffs of other players in the coalition as equally important as their own payoffs. If we use a numerical value to denote how much one player cares for another player's payoff, this value will be zero for noncooperative games and one for cooperative games. One may naturally ask what if this value is set to be neither zero nor one.
In this paper, we introduce the concepts of relationship and supposed relationship. A relationship is a numerical value denoting how much one player cares for another player's payoff. A supposed relationship is a numerical value denoting a player's belief about how much one player cares for another player's payoff. Relationships and supposed relationships are determined by the players, and they are changeable in different stages of games. We propose a relationship model of games, in which strategic interaction among players is determined by the material payoffs, relationships and the players' beliefs about relationships. Cooperative games and noncooperative games, as well as those games that are neither cooperative nor noncooperative can be expressed and analyzed by using this model.
Interpersonal relationship has not attracted interests of research in game theory although it has long been an important topic of research in many social science disciplines such as psychology and politics (Kelley (2013) , Heider (2013) ). Game theorists take it for granted that the relationships between players are predetermined and they will never change during the strategic interactions of players.
Interdependent preference, which denotes that a player's preference depends on his/her opponent's payoff as well as his/her own payoff, has been used to explain cooperation phenomena in experimental economics (e.g. Bolton 1991 , 2000 , Binmore et al. 2002 , Ochs and Roth 1989 , Samuelson 2001 . It is quite similar to the relationship concept defined in this paper. Reputation effect pioneered by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) has been introduced into game theory to explain cooperation in repeated non-cooperative games. Relationship is obviously different from reputation in that reputation is independent of the game model and then has less effect in one-shot games. Cooper et al. (1996) and Chan (2000) suggested that reputation was unnecessarily the unique factor leading to cooperation in either infinitely or finitely repeated games.
In the rest of the paper, we introduce a novel game model taking into consideration the relationship and relationship change among players. We also show the application of our model in a large set of games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative. 
A Relationship Model
, where
is the strategy set, U is the payoff set, and R is the supposed relationship set. 
Under the relationship model, the players in a game choose their strategies according to their supposed payoffs. For example, player i's choice is determined by
. We prove in the following theorem that there must exist at least one Nash equilibrium for every game when players make choices according to their supposed payoffs. Let xy R and yx R denote the relationships between the players x and y, and xy y R and yx x R the corresponding supposed relationships of y and x. The supposed payoffs of player x can be computed according to (1) . They are expressed as a matrix as shown in Fig. 2 . What player x chooses between C and D depends on the values of xy R and yx x R . Choosing C is the dominant for player x when there are both 5 Comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 2 , the supposed payoffs of two players will be identical if xy y R and yx R are replaced by xy R and yx x R . C is the dominant strategy for player y when  , the supposed payoffs can be computed as shown in Fig. 4 . From Fig. 4(a) , D is dominant strategy for player y. Player x will choose C given that he/she believes that the other player will choose D. Similarly, from Fig. 4(b) , player y will also choose C given that he/she thinks the opponent would choose D. Thus, strategy profile (C, C) will be the outcome. In this scenario, both players have an altruistic attitude towards another player and thus they would choose C in order to maximize the other player's payoff. 
Repeated games
, where T is the number of iteration. The players in a repeated game will have to take relationship change into consideration when choosing their strategies. Relationship change reflects the complexity of intelligent decision making. It could be a complex action depending on how the players retrieve information from previous interactions with other players and how they update their supposed relationships.
One reason for relationship change in repeated games lies in the fact that previous strategic interactions provide new information about relationships so that the players should update their supposed relationships. Take the iterated prisoner's dilemma as an Let's consider an infinitely repeated ultimatum game. In each round, Row player proposes an offer of dividing one dollar between two players. If Column player accepts the offer, they receive the corresponding share. Otherwise, both players receive nothing. The minimum division of one dollar is one cent. 
Column player Accept Reject
Row player Figure 6 The supposed payoffs of Column player.
The supposed payoffs of two players can be computed according to the relationships and supposed relationships of In order for Column player to accept  , there must be , which transferred the information about Column player's relationship value to Row player. Row player would then have to increase the offer in order to make an agreement. From a sequence of offering and rejecting, they could infer the relationship values of the other side. This process is similar to a two-player bargaining game in which rational players will reach an agreement with in the bargaining. How players choose relationships to maximize payoffs can be a complex problem because it depends on their knowledge, experience, and strategic interactions in the game. Consider Column player in the above game as an example. Column player would set CR R to the value so that 
Conclusions
A generalized model of games that takes into consideration the relationships between players is proposed. Cooperative games and non-cooperative games are the special case of this model. There exists a significant set of games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative, which have not been investigated in game theory before.
We prove that there must exist a Nash equilibrium for every game under the relationship model so that equilibrium analysis developed in non-cooperative game theory can be applied. A prisoner's dilemma and a repeated ultimatum game are analyzed as applications of the relationship model.
One advantage of the relationship model lies in that it provides an accurate description of the players' attitudes toward others in game playing. Apart from cooperative and non-cooperative, a player's attitude toward another player could be sub-cooperative, hostile and dedicated. By taking supposed relationships into account, the attitudes of altruism and exploitation can be considered. Relationships and relationship changes make the strategies of players interdependent. Our future work will address the challenging issue of how the players take advantage of the relationships and the corresponding relationship changes.
